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Abstract 
Examining the challenges encountered in the making of 
New Labour the paper argues that whilst a market 
oriented approach can bring significant electoral 
benefits, there can be an unavoidable price to pay in 
loss of members and internal dissent for such electoral 
success. The paper concludes that party leaders will 
have to decide early on whether they are willing to 
accept a party product less to their liking by making 
compromises to dissenting party members, or pay the 
price in dissent and loss of members caused by forcing 
through a new party product. 
Key words: New Labour, membership dissent, market 
oriented party 
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Resisting Political Marketing: 
Lessons from the making of New Labour 
 
Introduction 
The marketisation of political parties has been a feature of the study of 
party organisations at least since the 1980s when Panebianco (1988) coined 
the phrase „electoral professional‟ party. The basic argument of this view of 
political parties is that they have turned to professionals, such as pollsters and 
PR managers, to help adjust the party‟s „product‟ to make it more appealing to 
voters. Particularly in the political marketing literature this is seen as a positive 
development. It is argued that „market oriented‟ parties, using professionals to 
design and sell their product, manage to combine electoral success with 
meeting voter demands (Lees-Marshment 2001). A prime example of a party 
which is said to have become market oriented is the British Labour Party in its 
„New Labour‟ guise. However, whilst the Labour Party has achieved 
significant external benefits in terms of unprecedented electoral success, it 
has also had to pay a price in internal dissent and loss of members. Labour‟s 
experience with market orientation and the problems the party encountered 
hold important lessons for other parties wanting to adopt a more market 
oriented approach to running a party organisation. 
This paper will analyse Labour‟s problems, explain some of the reasons 
behind the costs that Labour has incurred in becoming market oriented, and 
outline some of the lessons that can be learnt from Labour‟s experience. 
 
Market oriented parties 
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Panebianco argued that whilst policy making in the traditional mass party 
was based on what he call „the representative bureaucracy‟, in the electoral-
professional party it is based on the use of professionals (Panebianco 1988: 
264). By „representative bureaucracy‟ Panebianco meant that the party 
organisation and its members provide a close link between mass party 
leaders and the class gardée, that is the particular class that the party is 
dedicated to represent. This link worked by party members interacting with 
non-member supporters, then electing delegates or representatives to 
participate in party organisational meetings, such as the party conference, 
where the delegates relayed the wishes of the class gardée to the 
parliamentary party. The parliamentary party then worked to enact legislation 
to satisfy these wishes. The party members therefore performed a very 
important linkage function between elected and electors (see Lawson 1988). 
In the electoral professional party the contact between politicians and citizens 
is managed by „professionals (the so-called experts, technicians with special 
knowledge)‟ (Panebianco 1988: 264). Panebianco never specifies exactly 
what kind of experts he is referring to, but it is a fair assumption that what he 
meant was professional campaign organisers, pollsters, and what has 
become known as spin-doctors. In other words, voters no longer 
communicate their needs and wishes to politicians through grassroots party 
members, but through opinion polls and focus groups. This change is partly a 
response to an increasingly volatile electoral market where voters are less 
likely to vote according to class loyalties and family ties to parties, but rather 
according to flexible and changing calculations about which party is most 
likely to benefit voters personally. As a result parties have to understand the 
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immediate demands and wishes of voters if they are to be successful in the 
electoral arena. As Farrell and Webb put is: „The increasing tendency is less 
one of selling themselves to voters, but rather one of designing an appropriate 
product to match voter needs‟ (Farrell and Webb 2000: 102). This is what 
Lees-Marshment has called a market oriented approach (Lees-Marshment 
2001). According to Lees-Marshment a market oriented party „designs its 
behaviour to provide voter satisfaction. It uses market intelligence to identify 
voter demands, then designs its product to suit them.‟ (Lees-Marshment 2001: 
30).  
 
New Labour and market orientation 
According to Lees-Marshment the British Labour Party in its „New 
Labour‟ incarnation is „the most recent and easily identifiable case of political 
marketing. During 1992-97 the Labour Party became a classic Market-
Oriented Party‟ (Lees-Marshment 2001: 181). The New Labour „brand‟ was 
the culmination of a long process of reforms of the party‟s policies and 
organisation started in the mid to late 1980s by then party leader Neil Kinnock 
(see Russell 2005 for further details of the changes that happened in Labour). 
The term „New Labour‟ was the brain child of Tony Blair (Labour leader 1994-
2007) and his close advisers. New Labour involved significant changes to; 1) 
the party‟s organisation, especially in terms of policy making; 2) its symbols, 
particularly Clause IV of the party's constitution which set out the party‟s 
fundamental aims and principles, and; 3) its policies, embracing the use of 
private capital in provided public services and combined with a deep 
reluctance to use increases in income tax to fund public service investments. 
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New Labour therefore involved massive changes to almost every aspect of 
the party‟s life, both internally and externally. These changes resulted in 
unprecedented electoral success for the party between 1997 and 2005 
securing it three consecutive election victories, something the party had never 
achieved before. However, Lees-Marshment also criticises the Labour Party: 
 
But the New Labour design is a problem. During the 
market-oriented process, Labour alienated traditional 
supporters and critiques contend it has lost all its 
ideology and beliefs and stands for nothing (Lees-
Marshment 2001: 181) 
 
Lees-Marshment argues that to be successful as a market oriented party 
it has to go through a number of stages (see Figure 1). Most of these stages 
New Labour managed very well, as exemplified by a very skillful use of 
market intelligence in the form of polling data, opinion surveys and focus 
groups. However, where the party fell down was in convincing the party at 
large to embrace the New Labour product: „the extent to which the new 
product design was accepted by the party is questionable. Implementation 
was achieved superficially, but perhaps only because of the desire for 
electoral success and strict leadership control‟ (Lees-Marshment 2001: 193). 
Indeed, getting the party to accept the new product was less of a concern 
than electoral success. Rather, forced acquiescence was the order of the day: 
„Blair did not give much attention to adjusting the product to suit internal 
support. [...] All troubles were suppressed in the desire to win‟ (Lees-
Marshment 2001: 181).  
The result was that the party as a whole never really accepted the New 
Labour brand. Many members and party notables would proudly declare 
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themselves to be „Old Labour‟. According to Lees-Marshment, this could have 
been avoided had the leadership taken more care with „internal product 
adjustment‟ - that is adjust the product to make it more palatable to the party. 
The reason why this was not done, according to Lees-Marshment, was largely 
down to Blair‟s leadership style: 
[Blair] decided what should be done and argued the 
case for it. He could have asked the party in advance 
what they thought about whether the constitution needed 
to be changed, rather than argue the case after it had 
been decided. He might have gained more support that 
way. (Lees-Marshment 2001: 189-190) 
 
However, this paper will argue that whilst Lees-Marshment may be 
correct in her criticism of the shortcomings of New Labour‟s version of market 
orientation there are good reasons for why the New Labour leadership had 
problems particularly when it came to „internal product adjustment‟. As we 
shall see there are good reasons to believe that the Labour leadership may 
have gone with the fait accomplice approach because they knew that 
consultation would not have worked considering both how far they wanted to 
change the Labour product and the nature of the party. The dissent that the 
new product generated may therefore have been seen by the leadership as a 
price worth paying. 
 
Designing the Product 
However, before looking at the Labour Party itself we will first examine 
one of the central features of what a market oriented party is supposed to do: 
design a product to meet voter demands. The idea of a market orientation is 
that a party will take great care to research, design and sell its product. 
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According to Lees-Marshment (2001: 27) the product of a party is its 
behaviour at all levels and includes leadership, Members of Parliament, 
membership, staff, symbols, constitution, activities and policies (see Figure 2). 
However, these areas of behaviour are not identical and require very different 
approaches when trying to „design‟ them. When it comes to the first four areas 
we are not talking about something which can be designed on a drawing 
board the way a symbol can. Rather, we are talking about the behaviour of 
individuals, which is not really something one can „design‟, but rather 
something that has to be guided and controlled. It is true that it is entirely 
possible to gather information about what kind of individual behaviour is more 
or less attractive to voters. Leaders can then attempt to guide and control the 
behaviour of individuals in the party accordingly. Obviously, this very much 
requires the co-operation of the individuals concerned. The extent to which 
party members are willing to cooperate will depend on what party members 
feel about taking orders from their leaders.  
Obviously leaders are there to lead, and one might expect party 
members to be willing to follow their leaders. However, there are different 
ways of viewing leadership. The problem is that as Michels (1949) showed 
any organisation beyond a certain size needs fulltime leaders. Even in a party 
with aspiration for internal democracy it is quite simply impossible for 
everybody to be involved in the day to day running of the party once it is 
beyond a certain size (about 1000 members according to Michels). So, it is 
possible to view leaders simply as a necessary evil to be reined back as much 
as possible. As Duverger points out, in some parties „there is a certain more 
or less open mistrust of the parliamentary group, and a more or less definite 
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desire to subject it to the authority of an independent controlling committee‟ 
(Duverger 1964: xxxv).  If that is how leaders are viewed their ability to control 
party members according to some predetermined design may be problematic. 
To some extent the power of leaders to control the behaviour of the rest of the 
party is determined by the party rules, which ought to set out the power and 
responsibilities of the different element of the party. However, the party rules 
are written and amended by individuals within the party, so the balance of 
power between the leadership and the rest of the party will to a large extent 
be a reflection of the party‟s collective attitude to leadership. Michels (1949: 
61) argued that party members are generally grateful that there are people in 
the party who are willing to taken on the „burden‟ of leadership and are quite 
happy for the leadership to just get on with leading the party. However, as we 
shall see this is not universally true. 
When it comes to the latter four areas of a party‟s behaviour it is much 
more appropriate to talk about designing them. It is indeed possible to design 
a symbol or create party laws, activities and policies according to a design. 
Whilst this may be much easier to achieve than controlling the behaviour of 
individuals, it is still, as Lees-Marshment points out, necessary for the party 
leaders to convince the rest of the party that these changes are necessary. 
The extent to which it is possible to convince individuals within the party of the 
need for such changes will crucially depend on what party members feel 
about how a party‟s behaviour should be designed. Should it be designed 
according to the party‟s a priori principles, or according to the ever changing 
demands of the voters? In other words should the party design its product 
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according to the demands of the market or according to the fundamental 
values of the party? 
So, the extent to which party leaders can successfully move their party in 
a market oriented direction depends on the attitude of the party as a whole, 
both to the issue of leadership and to what should be the source of a party‟s 
product. 
The following will use data from questionnaire surveys carried out of 
Labour Party members to explain the problems the New Labour leadership 
have had in getting the party to support a new product based on market 
intelligence. 
 
New Labour’s challenges 
As Kirchheimer (1966) points out, one of the things that often happens 
when a party tries to expand beyond its traditional audience or market is that 
„ideological baggage‟ gets jettisoned. This can be necessary when trying to 
design a new product to suit voter demands. So, if the product is seen as 
being unattractive, it will obviously have to be changed. As we can see from 
Table 1 dumping party principles for electoral purposes is not a popular 
proposal in the Labour Party. A massive 61.8 percent of those asked in 1999 
believed that the party should stick to its principles even if it meant losing an 
election. This is almost identical to what it was in 1989-90, that is in what was 
then still a pre-„New‟ Labour Party. It therefore seems that Labour members 
have a long standing opposition to ditching party principles in the name of 
electoral expediency. Clearly, this will limit the manoeuvrability of party 
leaders in adopting a new product. 
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Having said that, one of the things that New Labour leaders were careful 
to emphasise was that New Labour was not about ditching Labour‟s traditional 
values, but about fighting for them with new tools. As Blair said to the Labour 
conference in 2003: „From now on, we said: we stand for certain values. The 
values are unchangeable. But the policies are open to change. We made the 
ends sacrosanct. We put the means up for discussion so that each time could 
find the right expression for values that are for all time‟.1 Within that discourse 
it might still be possible to satisfy those wanting to put principles above votes, 
whilst still changing the product. 
 However, in addition to using new tools for a new era, a major element 
of New Labour's platform has been based on capturing the middle ground of 
politics. For example, in the lead up to the 2005 general election, Tony Blair is 
quoted as having said: „It is time for a second phase of New Labour, defined 
less by reference to the old Labour Party, than by an agenda for the country, 
radical but firmly in the centre ground‟.2 In his speech to the 2003 Labour 
Party conference Blair said „By occupying the centre ground, by modernising, 
by reaching out beyond our activists, we helped turn the Tories into a replica 
of what we used to be‟.3 These are just two example of what has been a 
consistent and dominant theme in New Labour. However, as can be seen 
from Table 2 there has been considerable opposition to the drive to move the 
Labour Party towards the centre. It is true that in 1999 44.6 percent of Labour 
members surveyed agreed or agreed strongly with the view that the Labour 
Party should move to the middle ground of politics. Nevertheless, a third of 
                                               
1
  http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour2003/story/0,,1052752,00.html accessed 17 August 2007 
2
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/basics/4348533.stm accessed 17 August 
2007.  
3
  http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour2003/story/0,,1052752,00.html accessed 17 August 2007 
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the party indicates an opposition to the move to the centre ground, with a 
further 21 percent being undecided. This explains both why the leadership 
were successful in moving the party to the centre, but also why they faced 
considerable opposition in doing so. The leadership could more often than not 
win a party conference vote on centre seeking policy proposals, but with a 
third of members opposed to some degree, it was never going to be done 
quietly. It is also worth noting that even in 1989-90, fours years before Blair 
came to power there was considerable opposition to a centre ground 
approach with 32.8 percent against. In other words, the opposition to moving 
to the centre ground is not something sparked by the creation of New Labour, 
and can therefore not be blamed on insufficient internal adjustment. Clearly, 
even in Old Labour there was considerable opposition to a centre ground 
approach.4 
However, the opinions and possible opposition of members to certain 
policy initiatives is one thing. Quite another is if they are willing to express 
their disagreement and dissatisfaction when being given instructions from 
their leaders about how to behave, what policies to promote and what 
symbols to fight for. As has been pointed out elsewhere: „what is needed for 
membership dissent to occur is not just disagreement but also the willingness 
to dissent‟ (Pettitt 2006: 297). In other words, even if members disagree with 
their leaders they may still follow them. The extent to which party members 
are willing to follow their leaders despite disagreeing with them depends, as 
argued above, on the party‟s view of leadership. As can be seen from Table 3 
Labour has a somewhat sceptical view of leadership. A plurality of 42.1 
                                               
4
  Having said that it is also clear that support for a centre ground approach has declined 
markedly from 55.5 percent in 1992 to 44.6 percent in 1999. Clearly, the reality in 1999 of moving to 
the centre ground has been considerably less appealing than the theory in 1992. 
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percent of members disagreed with the statement that the role of party 
members is to follow the leadership‟s decisions, thus outnumbering those who 
agreed with it by 2.5 percentage points. There is therefore a significant group 
in the party who feel that they have a right to resist the leadership‟s decisions. 
Considering this evidence, Blair was probably speaking from experience when 
in 2003 he said: „I know I can't say "I am the leader, follow me". Not that that 
was your strong point anyway.‟5 
We can therefore see that the New Labour leadership has been faced 
with a two-fold problem when trying to adapt Labour‟s products to the 
demands of the market. Firstly, the members have for a long time been 
uncomfortable with the party moving to the centre of politics. Secondly, there 
is a notable willingness in the party to resist leadership decisions. It therefore 
seems that the New Labour leadership has had to deal with a significant 
section of the membership which was not only worried about the New Labour 
project, but also happy to express that worry. Also looking back on Labour 
history it has not just been the „New‟ Labour leadership which has come under 
attack from the members. Indeed, as has been pointed out elsewhere:  
...throughout much of the Labour Party‟s history its 
annual conference was seen by a significant number of 
conference delegates as an opportunity to explain to the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in great detail and at 
great length what it was doing wrong (Pettitt 2006: 289).  
 
Complaints about the leadership‟s line is therefore not a New Labour 
problem or something created by the manner in which the New Labour 
product was implemented but a long standing Labour tradition. Indeed, it was 
only with New Labour‟s reforms of the policy making process and the New 
                                               
5
  http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour2003/story/0,,1052752,00.html accessed 17 August 2007 
  14 
Labour leadership‟s so called „control freakery‟ that some of this dissent was 
brought under control. Opposition to the New Labour product was and  is 
therefore not necessarily something which could have been dealt with through 
wider consultation. Indeed, wider consultation may have increased dissent by 
giving opponents of the New Labour project advance warning of what was 
coming and therefore more time to organise. 
 
New Labour’s problems in perspective 
However, one might well ask to what extent the problems the New 
Labour leadership faced with a rebellious membership is somehow unique. 
Would other party leaders have to face the same kind of resistance, or did the 
New Labour leaders just not do a very good job at dealing with a 
rebelliousness found in all parties? This is not an easy question to answer as 
there is very little comparative data. However, there is still some data we can 
examine. 
As we can see from Table 4, in 1992 the members of the British 
Conservative Party were even more reluctant than the Labour Party members 
to sacrifice political principles for electoral expediency. This significant 
difference may well be down to the fact that by this time the Labour Party had 
been in opposition for more than a decade. It would therefore seem that 
Labour would have been an easier party to make market oriented then the 
Conservatives at that time. However, as we can see from Table 5, the 
Conservative party was at that time far more willing than the Labour Party to 
make a move to the centre. The opposition to centre ground policies in Labour 
is therefore marked compared to the Conservative Party. The difference 
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between the two sets of answers can perhaps be explained by the fact that 
the centre ground in 1992 was identified more with the Conservative Party 
than the Labour Party. The members of both parties were reluctant to give up 
ideological values for electoral expediency, but Conservative Party members 
were less reluctant to move to the centre than Labour Party members, 
because the centre was associated with conservative values. Hence overall, 
the Labour Party would have been more difficult to move to the centre through 
a market oriented approach to the party‟s product. 
Looking beyond the UK the problems of the New Labour leaders are 
illustrated further. Table 6 shows the level of rebelliousness in Labour 
compared to the rebelliousness in Danish parties. The first thing to note is that 
in Labour‟s Danish sister party, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne, 
SD) members are considerably more loyal towards the leadership than in 
Labour. As we can see, an overall, if slim majority of SD member agree that 
their role is to support decisions made by the leadership. Further, apart from 
the Social Liberals, centre parties of both the left and the right have a 
reasonably loyal membership. It therefore appears that, at least in this limited 
sample, Labour has an unusually high level of rebelliousness and resistance 
to centrist policies compared to other parties of the political centre. 
 
Discussion 
This was then the problem Blair faced when he embarked on his project 
to create his market oriented „New Labour‟: a membership with a significant 
element of rebelliousness, a strong affinity with traditional Labour principles 
and an unwillingness to move to the political centre. Instead of consultation 
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and adjustment a major part of the solution to this problem was to change the 
party's internal decision making processes radically in ways which according 
to Shaw meant that „many of the channels for voicing criticism and 
challenging the leadership [were] either closed down or rendered ineffective‟ 
(2002: 148). Shaw also argued that „the new policy making system has 
undoubtedly helped prevent the highly publicised conflicts which marred 
relations between the government and the party in the 1970s‟ (p 157) again 
suggesting that criticism of the leadership is not a New Labour problem. 
However, the price for quelling membership dissent has been not only a sharp 
drop in membership, no doubt partly because members have felt themselves 
to be ignored, but also, as Lees-Marshment points out above an only partly 
successful move towards market orientation. 
However, as we have seen above the presence of a significant element 
of rebelliousness made consultation difficult. There is no doubt that there was 
much to criticise about Blair‟s leadership style, but considering the major 
changes necessary in order to make the party market-oriented and the nature 
of the Labour Party it is entirely likely that no method would have yielded a 
satisfactory result.  
One of the main lesson to be learnt from the process of moving the 
Labour Party in a market oriented direction is that regardless of how the 
product is designed and adjusted in the light of internal reaction there will 
sometimes be, even considerable, dissent. It is possible that dissent can be 
reduced through consultation, but depending on the attitude of members the 
level of compromise necessary to avoid dissent could make the process of 
marketisation meaningless. If the product is changed too much in the light of 
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internal reaction it may no longer be attractive to voters and there is little point 
in going through the process of designing an appealing product. In other 
words the lesson from Labour‟s move towards a more market oriented 
position is that in some parties the process can only be partially successful. 
Not because the process has been carried out badly, but because the raw 
material - the party organisation - is simply not willing to become market 
oriented. It may still be possible to use a market oriented approach to achieve 
remarkable electoral success, as has been the case for the Labour Party 
between 1997 and 2005. However, depending on the nature of a party there 
can be an unavoidable price for such success, in the case of the Labour Party 
the loss of more than two thirds of its members since the mid-1990s and 
considerable internal dissent. The Labour leadership had the choice between 
forcing a new product on a reluctant membership and pay a price in dissent 
and loss of members, or not go as far as they wanted in creating the product 
they thought would ensure the success of the New Labour project. The lack of 
consultation with the party members may therefore be less to do with a failure 
to adjust the product based on internal reaction, and more to do with a 
conscious decision to pay the price of pushing through the New Labour 
product based on the knowledge that no amount of consultation would 
succeed in bring the party to where the leadership wanted it to be. Labour is 
therefore an example of what a market oriented approach can do for a party in 
terms of electoral success, but also a warning of what the price can be. Party 
leaders wanting to move in a market oriented direction therefore have to make 
a conscious decision on what price they are willing to pay, either in terms of 
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accepting a product less to their liking, or in the organisational costs of 
pushing through a product the party is reluctant to accept. 
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Table 1: The Labour Party should always stand by its principles even if this should 
lose an election 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
1989-90 60.8% 11.9% 27.3% 4936 
1999 61.8% 16.7% 21.5% 5517 
Data source:  Seyd and Whiteley (1999) and Seyd et al (1992). 
 
Table 2: Labour should adjust policies to capture the middle ground of politics 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
1989-90 57.3% 9.9% 32.8% 4911 
1999 45.0% 21.0% 34.0% 5530 
Data source:  Seyd and Whiteley (1999) and Seyd et al (1992). 
The product is a party’s behaviour at all levels and includes: 
The leadership 
Members of Parliament 
Membership 
Staff 
Symbols 
Constitution 
Activities 
Policies 
 
Lees-Marshment 2001: 27 
Figure 2: The product 
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Table 3: The role of party members is to support decisions made by the leadership 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
Labour 
1999 
39.6% 18.2% 42.1% 5568 
Data source:  Seyd and Whiteley (2002) 
 
Table 4: Tory and Labour: should always stand by its principles even if this should 
lose an election 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
Conservatives 
1992 
81.3% 8.2% 10.5% 2404 
Labour 1989-90 60.8% 11.9% 27.3% 4936 
Data source:  Seyd et al (1992) and Whiteley et al (1992). 
 
 
Table 5: Tory and Labour: should adjust policies to capture the middle ground of 
politics 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
Conservatives 
1992 
69.7% 13.3% 17.0% 2305 
Labour 1989-90 57.3% 9.9% 32.8% 4911 
Data source:  Seyd et al (1992) and Whiteley et al (1992). 
 
Table 6: The role of party members is to support decisions made by the leadership 
Labour and Danish parties. 
 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
Disagree/Strongly 
Disagree 
Total n 
British Labour 39.6% 18.2% 42.1% 5568 
Danish parties 
Left wing 
Red Green Alliance 16.3% 10.3% 73.4% 612 
Socialist People’s Party 20.4% 10.6% 69% 519 
Social Democrats 50.7% 14.8% 34.5% 588 
Social Liberals 26.3% 14.7% 59.0% 571 
Centre 
Centre Democrats 51.5% 18.8% 29.7% 464 
Christian Democrats 48.6% 22.1% 29.3% 447 
Liberals 54.6% 17.6% 27.8% 529 
Conservatives 59.1% 16.6% 24.3% 559 
Danish People’s Party 76.9% 11.5% 11.7% 489 
Right wing 
Data source:  Bille et al (2000) and Seyd and Whiteley (2002).  Data is for 1999 for Labour 
and 2001 for Danish parties. 
 
 
 
